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The Future of SoftWare Copyright




With the global evolution of the computer industry,' litigation con-
cerning copyright protection for computer programs has dramatically in-
creased.2 Historically, the copyright laws were designed to protect the
original expression of ideas embodied in literary works, works of art, mu-
* B.A., University of California, San Diego, 1983; J.D., University of California, Has-
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support and encouragement.
1. See THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY DATA BOOK 52 (1989) [hereinafter
CBEMA DATA BOOK] ("During 1987, the European Economic Community (EEC) again
purchased the largest share of U.S. computer and business equipment industry exports. Ex-
ports to the EEC amounted to $9.2 billion .... The fastest growing markets for [U.S. com-
puter and business equipment] industry exports between 1980 and 1987 were the Far East, the
rest of North America, and Australia and Oceania with 20.3%, 16.4%, and 16.2% average
annual growth, respectively.").
2. Computer manufacturers and programmers have eagerly sought copyright as their
primary source of legal protection since the protection afforded under the Copyright Act is so
expansive, providing the author with the exclusive right to reproduce, adapt, publish, perform,
and display his work. Chandler, Proprietary Protection of Computer Software, 11 U. BALT. L.
REV. 195, 214 (1982). However, computer programmers may also seek legal protection for
their work under the alternative forms of intellectual property laws such as patent, trade se-
cret, and trademark. These alternatives, however, are not the subject of this Article and are
therefore not discussed. For further readings regarding federal patent protection for computer
programs, see, e.g., Moskowitz, The Metamorphosis of Software-Related Invention Patentabil-
ity, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 273, 280-85 (1982); J. SOMA, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW
§§ 2.03-.04 (1983); Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 23
JURIMETRICS J. 337, 348-59 (1983); 1 D. BENDER, COMPUTER LAW § 3.01 (1988).
For further readings on the application of common law and state statutory trade secret
laws to computer software, see, e.g., R. WHITESEL, UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT (1984);
Gilburne & Johnston, Trade Secret Protection for Software Generally and in the Mass Market,
3 COMPUTER L.J. 211, 216 (1982); Bender, Trade Secret Software Protection, 3 COMPUTER L.
SERV. (1977); G. DAVIS, SOFTWARE PROTECTION, 142-61 (1985); Note, Patentability of Com-
puter Programs, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 494 (1973); Comment, Patentability: Piecing Together
the Computer Software Patent Puzzle, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 351 (1975).
For further reading on the use of trademark protection for computer programs, see, e.g.,
DAVIS, supra, at 162-86; A.. MILLER & G. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT 1-2 (1983); Chandler, supra, at 195, 213-15 (1982).
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sic, and artistic performance.3 However, in this age of high technology,
the copyright laws have been amended to extend, at best, strained protec-
tion to computer programs as literary works.4 Although these laws are
clearly intended to apply to computer programs, 5 the morass of litigation
over computer copyright demonstrates that current copyright law,
coupled with traditional litigation as its method of enforcement, does not
provide adequate protection to works as complex as computer
programs.6
Prior to the Copyright Act of 1976, 7 computer programs were con-
sidered ineligible for copyright protection.8 With the passage of the
Copyright Act, computer programs were still not expressly included
within the scope of federal protection.9 However, the proliferation of
computers in the international marketplace, combined with the growing
recognition of the need for legal protection for computer programs ° and
3. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1989). See also Conley & Bryan, A Unifying Theory for the Litiga-
tion of Computer Software Copyright Cases, 6 COMPUTER L.J. 55, 65 (1985).
4. See generally Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 1329 (1987); Kaufman, Copyrighting Object Code: Applying Old Legal Tools to New
Technologies, 4 COMPUTER L.J. 421 (1983). See also HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL
REPORT 3 (1979) [hereinafter CONTU FINAL REPORT].
5. The legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 suggests that computer programs
could be regarded as an extension of copyrightable subject matter Congress had already in-
tended to protect, and were thus considered copyrightable from the outset without the need of
new legislation. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5667 ("'[L]iterary works' . .. includes ... computer
programs to the extent they incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression of original
ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves."). However, contrary to this suggestion, the
Copyright Act does not expressly list computers as works of authorship. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1989). Moreover, Congress specifically stated that in drafting the 1976 Act "it did not ad-
dress or deal with computer issues." CONTU FINAL REPORT supra note 4, at 7 (citing 17
U.S.C. § 117 and H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra). See also id. at 9; Miller, Silicon Court: High-
Tech World Sees IBM Case as Way Out of the Copyright Maze, Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 1987, at 1,
col. 6 ("Current copyright law was never intended to apply to machines as complex as com-
puters," quoting R. Hinkley, attorney for NEC Corp.).
6. Coy, IBM-Fujitsu Order Exposes Morass of Software Copyright Law, Associated Press,
Oct. 19, 1987, Business News Section ("The decisive action announced Tuesday [in the IBM/
Fujitsu arbitration] contrasted conspicuously with the legal morass that has enveloped the field
of computer software copyrights."). See generally Comment, Copyright Protection for Pro-
grams stored in Computer Chips: Competing with IBM and Apple, 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 103
(1984); Miller, Silicon Court: High-Tech World Sees IBM Case as Way Out of Copyright Maze,
Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
7. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1989).
8. See Chandler, supra note 2, at 215 ("The first deposit of a computer program for
copyright registration was made on November 30, 1961, but it was not until 1964 that the
Register of Copyrights decided computer programs could be accepted for registration.").
9. The Copyright Act of 1976 does not expressly list computer programs as works of
authorship. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1989).
10. Chandler, supra note 2, at 195.
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the influence of giant conglomerates running the industry, made amend-
ments to the Copyright Act inevitable."' In 1980, Congress passed the
Computer Software Act,12 providing a working definition for computer
programs within the Copyright Act and explicitly granting computer
programs the sole statutory exception from the normal proscriptions
against copying.' 3 In 1984, Congress also passed the Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act, creating a new form of copyright protection for
intellectual property embedded in semiconductor chips. 14 Recently, the
United States joined the Berne Convention, an international multilateral
copyright treaty, which affords U.S. software firms equitable legal protec-
tion in seventy-seven other signatory nations.' 5
Despite these congressional attempts to provide adequate legal pro-
tection to computer programs, disputes continue to arise due to the com-
plexity of various types of programs and their ready availability to
copying.16 The protection extended by existing copyright law has simply
not been satisfactory."7 Moreover, the traditional method of enforcing
copyright protection of computer programs through litigation has re-
ceived severe criticism from the computer industry and the legal commu-
11. In 1974, Congress created the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works (CONTU) to assist in its effort to comprehensively revise the copyright
laws. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 1. CONTU's primary objective was to de-
velop and recommend a national policy that would provide "adequate legal protection for
intellectual work embodied in new technologies while ensuring public access to those new
technologies." Menell, supra note 4, at 1329 (citing CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at
3). Based on CONTU's majority recommendations, Congress passed the Software Act of
1980. Pub. L. No. 96-517, §§ 10(a), 10(b), 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980).
12. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117
(1989)).
13. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1989).
14. Pub. L. No 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (1989)). See
Menell, supra note 4, at 1353 ("In 1984, Congress enacted legislation establishing a new cate-
gory of legal protection for intellectual work embodied in semiconductor chips (mask works).
Since computer software may be fixed in such works (e.g., the fixing of object code in ROMs),
the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act (SCPA) provides yet another means by which pro-
grammers may protect the intellectual work contained in computer software.").
15. The Copyright Act was amended to conform to the Berne Convention by the Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, which took effect on March 1, 1989, the date the
United States was scheduled to join the Berne Convention. Pub.L. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2857,
2861 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914).
16. See Comment, Copyright Protection for Programs Stored in Computer Chips: Compet-
ing with IBM and Apple, 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 103, 108 (1984) ("Once stored in ROM [read
only memory] the copyright on the program may be infringed by causing the computer to print
out the contents of the ROM, by printing out the contents of the ROM with a development
machine, or by transferring the contents of the ROM to another ROM through the use of a
computer or ROM duplicator."); DAVIS, supra note 2, at 56.
17. See generally Menell, supra note 4; Program, Decompilation and Disassembly: Undo-
ing Software Protection, COMPUTER LAW., Feb. 1984, at 1, 2.
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nity.18 The costs of litigating a computer copyright infringement case are
staggering and the remedies available are seldom effective.19 Addition-
ally, the courts continue to apply simplistic copyright principles in com-
plex computer contexts where the factfinder is usually unfamiliar with
the technology he is examining. The recent NEC/Intel lawsuit2" illus-
trates how poorly traditional litigation is suited to handle complex copy-
right disputes over new technology.
This article addresses the limitations of traditional litigation in the
context of complex computer copyright disputes. Section I .provides a
brief synopsis of existing copyright law and the statutory remedies avail-
able to successful copyright litigants. It also sets forth the elements nec-
essary in proving an infringement case and identifies the costs inherent in
maintaining such an action. It then analyzes the recent decision and pro-
tracted litigation of NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp.21 Section II discusses the
"hybrid" form of private, informal arbitration developed during the
IBM/Fujitsu settlement,22 which granted unprecedented powers to the
arbitrators to resolve not only past and present disputes between the par-
ties but any future conflicts which might arise. Section III analyzes this
"hybrid" arbitration method and compares it to the traditional form of
litigation exemplified in the NEC/Intel lawsuit. Finally, in Section IV,
this Article concludes that traditional dispute resolution under existing
copyright laws in the context of complex computer technology. is inade-
quate and that the new "hybrid" form of arbitration is a viable alterna-
tive to litigation, providing realistic and effective remedies for the
participants while ensuring that the public interest is protected.
Traditional Dispute Resolution: Litigation Warfare
A. Existing Copyright Protection
Under the Copyright Act of 1976,23 protection is provided to all
"[o]riginal works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
18. See Coy, supra note 6.
19. See generally Menell, supra note 4; DAVIS, supra note 2.
20. This lawsuit culminated in NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., No. C-84-20799-WPG (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 6, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed libary, Dist. file), 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1177 (Apr. 17,
1989).
21. Id.
22. International Business Machines Corp. v. Fujitsu Ltd., No. 13T-117-0636-85, Am.
Arb. Ass'n Commercial Arb. Tribunal Opinion p.1, Sept. 15, 1987 (Mnookin & Jones, arbs.).
23. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1989).
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of a machine or device." 24 Although computer programs are not explic-
itly listed among the works of authorship encompassed by the Copyright
Act,25 the definitional section of.the statute was amended to include
computer programs when Congress passed the Software Protection Act
of 1980.26 The 1980 amendments also provide a special exception for
computer programs to the normal proscriptions against copying.
27
By passage of the Software Protection Act, Congress expressly ex-
tended copyright protection to computer programs. However, due to the
complexity of programming and the simplicity of the 1980 amendments,
the courts remained confused as to the scope of such protection to partic-
ular types of programs.28 The primary source of confusion focused on
the distinctions between application programs and operating system pro-
grams.29 Not until Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.30
did the federal courts agree that computer programs in any form, fixed in
24. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1989).
25. As statutorily defined, "A 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to
be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1989).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1989).
27. Id. See also Menell, supra note 4, at 1347. The 1980 software exception in the
amended Copyright Act provides that it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a
computer program "to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that
computer program" if a copy is necessary for "the utilization of the computer program" or
"for archival purposes only." 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1989). The software exception further permits
"any exact copies" to be "leased, sold, or otherwise transferred" but "only with authorization
from the copyright owner." Id.
28. For example, in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984), the Third Circuit noted the trial court's
confusion in applying copyright law to computer programs:
It is difficult to discern precisely why the district court questioned the copyright-
ability of the programs at issue. There is no finding, statement, or holding on which
we [the appellate court] can focus which clearly sets forth the district court's view.
Throughout the opinion the district court referred to the "complexity of the question
presented by the present case," .... and the "baffling" problem at issue.
Id. at 1246.
For further readings which provide more in-depth discussion and analysis of the deci-
sional history concerning the scope of copyright protection for computer programs, see Com-
ment, supra note 16, at 103; Rodau, Protecting Computer Software.- After Apple v. Franklin,
Does Copyright Provide the Best Protection?, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 527 (1984); Conley & Bryan, supra
note 3, at 55.
29. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin, 714 F.2d 1240. An operating system is a pro-
gram which manages the internal functions of a computer, coordinating the reading and writ-
ing of data between the internal memory and external devices (e.g., disk drives, keyboard,
printers), as well as performing simple housekeeping functions for the computer. Id. at 1243.
Primarily, an operating system prepares and assists the computer in executing application pro-
grams. Id. Application programs, on the other hand, perform a wide range of data processing
tasks for the computer user, including bookkeeping, word processing, data processing, and
even video games. Mcneil, supra note 4, at 1334.
30. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
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any medium, fall within the scope of the Copyright Act.3" Only recently
have microcodes, programs embedded on semiconductor chips, been rec-
ognized as protectible forms of computer programs under the copyright
laws.32
The author of a copyrightable program, that is, a program constitut-
ing an original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium, is granted
the exclusive right to the use of that program.33 He receives the sole
right to reproduce the copyrighted program in any format or medium, to
prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted program, and to dis-
tribute copies of the copyrighted program to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, rental, lease, or loan.34 Copyright in a program
subsists at the time of its creation and endures for the life of the author
plus fifty years.35 Copyright law, however, protects the form in which
the idea is expressed, not the idea itself.36
The statutory remedies available to the author of a copyrightable
program are expansive. If the author establishes that the program has
been copied without his consent, he may seek an immediate preliminary
injunction, and ultimately, a permanent injunction to restrain infringers
from violating his rights.37 The author may also seek a court order im-
pounding all infringing reproductions of the program while the infringe-
ment suit is pending, and, upon its conclusion, obtain an order
destroying the infringing copies as part of the final judgment.3" Further,
the copyright holder may recover actual damages for lost profits as well
as any additional profits realized by the infringer during the course of his
unauthorized use of the program.39 Alternatively, he may elect to re-
cover statutory damages, ranging from $500 to $20,000 in ordinary in-
fringement cases, and up to $100,000 in the case of willful
infringement.' The court has the discretion to award costs and reason-
able attorneys' fees to the infringed party.41 Attorney fees and statutory
damages, however, may not be recovered where infringement occurs
prior to registration of the copyright, unless it was registered within three
31. Id. at 1247-54; Comment, supra note 16, at 120.
32. NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1178 (microcode is copyright-
able). However, this ruling was made by a federal trial court and is not binding authority upon
other courts.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1989).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 302(a).
36. Id. at § 102(b).
37. Id. at § 502.
38. Id. at § 503.
39. Id. at § 504(b).
40. Id. at § 504(c).
41. Id. at § 505.
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months of its initial distribution.42 Additionally, criminal sanctions are
available in cases involving willful infringement and fraudulent removal
of copyright notice, carrying fines ofup to $50,000 and a two-year maxi-
mum imprisonment.4"
Although the statutory remedies may be extensive, they usually are
ineffective due to the high rate of obsolescence in the computer indus-
try." In 1987, the U.S. computer industry spent approximately $1 bil-
lion on the research and development of software alone.45 It is estimated
that in 1987 the U.S. computer and business industry spent over $13
billion on research and development overall.46 Hence, by the time a final
judgment is rendered in a complex computer copyright case, the software
at issue is usually antiquated or displaced by new generations of the
product.
In any event, before statutory remedies can apply, the copyright
holder must successfully prosecute an infringement suit. To do so, the
copyright holder must establish two basic elements: the validity of the
copyright and the existence of copying.47 With respect to the former, a
copyright is considered valid if the work falls within the scope of subject
matter defined by the Copyright Act.48 As noted earlier, the federal
courts currently recognize that all forms of computer programs are sub-
ject to copyright protection.49
Although copyright registration is not a prerequisite to copyright
protection of a program, it is required to maintain an infringement suit.5°
At the time of litigation, registration of the program's copyright provides
prima facie evidence of its validity and shifts the burden of proof to the
defendant.5 ' An author of a copyrighted computer program, however,
may forfeit its protection if he fails to place notice of such copyright on
42. Id. at § 412.
43. Id. at § 506.
44. See Sieg, Court Ruling Good News for NEC and Intel, Reuters, Feb. 8, 1989, Financial
Report Section.
45. CBEMA DATA BOOK, supra note 1, at 43.
46. Id.
47. See NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1183; Conley & Bryan, supra
note 3, at 75 (citing 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][1] (1984)). Damages
must also be proven in order to successfully litigate a copyright infringement case; however,
this element is generally not difficult to establish since the computer program at issue is usually
the plaintiff's product and therefore is a valued business asset. Conley & Bryan, supra note 3,
at 75 (citing Software Rentals: Piracy is the Hot New Issue, Bus. WK., Aug. 1, 1983, at 90-91,
which discusses the economic value of software and the financial threat of illegal copying
through rentals).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1989).
49. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1989).
51. Id. at § 410(c).
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more than a "relatively small number" of copies which are publicly
distributed.
5 2
The majority of decisions concerning computer copyright have fo-
cused primarily on the first element, whether the computer program at
issue was subject to copyright protection.53 Relatively few decisions have
been published that define a standard for determining the second ele-
ment, whether a computer program has actually been copied.54 This is
generally due to the fact that most defendants have admitted to copying
in nearly all cases.55 It is also probably the result of the court's reluc-
tance or inability to engage in a technical analysis of computer technol-
ogy because of its general unfamiliarity with the medium.
A prima facie case of copying can be established by showing that the
alleged infringer had access to the copyrighted program and that the al-
leged infringing program is "substantially similar" to the copyrighted
program.56 Access is generally not difficult to demonstrate since the de-
fendant is usually a purchaser or licensee of the copyright holder's pro-
gram, and, in some cases, access is presumed where the program is
readily available on the market.57 Proving substantial similarity, how-
ever, presents a predicament for the courts since they must endeavor to
unravel the intricacies of computer technology in order to compare the
two programs and make a knowledgeable decision.
In determining whether substantial similarity exists, the courts gen-
erally rely on the "ordinary observer" test."8 Whether this standard is
appropriate in the context of computer copyright has been the subject of
much criticism.59 It is argued that although this standard is proper in
cases involving simple literary works, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
apply these general copyright principles in computer infringement
suits. ° This is primarily because an'ordinary lay observer is often inca-
pable of comparing computer programs. 6' It is particularly difficult to
52. Id. at § 401(a).
53. Comment, supra note 16, at 106-07, 109 ("[C]ourt decisions tend to view copyright
issues primarily as a definitional exercise.").
54. Chandler, supra note 2, at 228.
55. Comment, supra note 16, at 107.
56. See Conley & Bryan, supra note 3,' at 79. & n. 159.
57. Id. at 76 & n. 144 ("Direct evidence of copying, by admission or eyewitness testimony,
is often unavailable. Thus, courts have long allowed copying to be proved circumstantially by
showing access to the infringed work and substantial similiarity .
58. Id. at 77-84.
59. Id. at 77-78. See also Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222,
1232-33 (3rd Cir 1986), cert. denied, 479 U:S. 1031 (1987).
60. Conley & Bryan, supra note 3, at 78.
61. Id.
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determine whether substantial similarities exist in the two complex forms
of program language, known as source and object code.
Relative to proving substantial similarity, courts have also struggled
with the application of the "idea/expression dichotomy" in the context
of computer copyright.62 This doctrine provides that only the expression
of an idea may be subject to copyright, not the idea itself.63 Merger of
idea and expression may be established by showing that there are only a
limited number of ways in which the idea may be expressed. Where the
"underlying ideas are capable of only a limited range of expression, they
'may be protected only against virtually identical copying.' "" When the
idea and its expression merge, becoming inseparable, copying the expres-
sion is not considered infringement since "protecting the 'expression'
would confer a monopoly of the 'idea.' "65 Where merger exists, a find-
ing of substantial similarity will be precluded.66
Hence, the prosecution of a complex computer copyright case can
strain even the most astute litigator. The courts' inflexible application of
general copyright principles to computer infringement cases places the
burden upon the parties to educate the factfinder and work around the
inadequacies of existing copyright law. It is no wonder that computer
copyright cases take several years to reach final judgment.
Although copyright plaintiffs are estimated to prevail seventy per-
cent of the time,6 7 the cost of maintaining an infringement suit is extraor-
dinarily prohibitive. Legal fees for complex copyright disputes are
substantial, ranging in the hundreds of thousands, and sometimes mil-
lions, of dollars.68 Out-of-pocket costs in such litigation are also stagger-
ing since the services of computer and legal experts are required to
interpret the evidence for the judge and jury. Since the judge and jury
are usually unfamiliar with even the basics of computer technology, let
alone the complexity and nuances of individual programs, education of
the trier of fact is essential to the success of a computer infringement
62. See Comment, supra note 16, at 105; 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.03[A] (1984).
63. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1989); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 62, at § 13.03[A].
64. NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d,(BNA) at 1188 (quoting Judge Browning in
H. Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)).
65. Id.
66. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 62, at § 13.03[A].
67. Chandler, supra note 2, at 229 & nn.249, 251.
68. See DAVIS, supra note 2, at 317-18. Generally large computer firms retain in-house
counsel as well as regular outside intellectual property and litigation counsel. The firms of
Intel Corp., NEC Corp., IBM and Fujitsu Ltd. are no exception. The outside legal counsel
which they retained in their disputes were from well-established law firms that bill their clients
fees commensurate for their services. Considering the time involved for investigation, discov-
ery, preparation of pleadings and court appearances, and computer expert consultations, it is
clear that the legal fees are substantial, probably ranging in the millions of dollars.
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action.69 Additionally, the time expended by the copyright holder and
other company personnel during litigation may cost the firm millions of
dollars in lost research and development, new innovations, and revenues
in marketing the software.7°
In the event the copyright holder is unsuccessful in his infringement
action, he may be further compelled to pay not only his legal fees but also
the court costs incurred by the defendant in defending the suit."' In the
rare case, a copyright holder may also be held responsible for the defend-
ant's attorneys' fees, if his claims are considered by the court to be unrea-
sonable or meritless.72
These prohibitive costs are exacerbated by the amount of time which
is required to litigate a complex computer copyright dispute. While the
usual copyright infringement case involving simple literary works can be
tried within a few days, complicated software disputes may take up to six
months just to obtain a hearing date for a motion on a preliminary in-
junction.73 It is not uncommon for such cases to take several years to
conclude and even then a successful litigant may be forced back into
court on appeal or to enforce its rights against subsequent infringers.
In addition to the private costs born by the software copyright
holder in protecting his intellectual property rights, it has been suggested
that society bears considerable costs attributable to the legal protection
afforded computer programs. 74 Such costs include the loss of new inno-
vations due to monopolistic exploitation of intellectual property by a few
dominant firms, the administrative costs of documenting all software de-
velopment to prove originality and lack of copying, the legal costs of
keeping abreast of the current legal status of computer copyright, and ,the
cost of attorneys' fees for enforcing those legal rights. 75 All these costs
are ultimately born by the consumer.
While the courts struggle to define computer copyright law, debate
continues among legal commentators and practicing copyright litigators
as to the feasibility of copyright as an effective form of legal protection
for computer software and other forms of intellectual property embodied
in new technologies. 76 Some critics blame Congress for the current con-
69. Friedman & Kremen, The Selection and Use of Technical Experts in Computer Litiga-
tion, 5 COMPUTER LAW. 1 (June 1988).
70. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 317-18.
71. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1989).
72. Id.; Cloth v. Hyman, 146 F.Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). See also Morser v. Benger
Products Co., 283 F. Supp. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). But see Eisenschmil v. Facett Publications,
Inc., 246 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
73. See DAVIS, supra note 2, at 319.
74. Menell, supra note 4, at 1340.
75. Id.
76. See Rodau, supra note 28; Conley & Bryan, supra note 3; Kaufman, supra note 4.
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fusion because of its simplistic approach to legislating copyright laws for
a technology as complex and problematic as computer software." Still
other observers criticize the legal system, in general, as incapable of han-
dling disputes over software copyright protection. 78 It is this latter criti-
cism which is exemplified in the recent NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp. decision.
B. Case In Point: NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp.
Intel Corporation ("Intel") is the world's leading manufacturer of
microprocessors, the central chip which operates the internal functions
of a personal computer. 79 NEC Corporation ("NEC") is a large Japa-
nese electronics manufacturer which owns a California-based subsidiary
that produces microprocessors in competition with Intel."° In 1979, In-
tel began licensing several of its competitors to use, manufacture and sell
its 8086/88 series microprocessors. 81  The 8086/88 series contained
copyrighted microcode that consisted of a set of basic instructions which
operate the electronic circuitry within the microprocessor.8 2 Between
1981 and 1984, Intel issued similar licenses to NEC, Fujitsu and
Mitsubishi. 3
In developing its own series of microprocessers, NEC used Intel's
8086/88 microcode as a model to create a compatible microprocessor
which could be used with Intel's licensed products.84 In 1984, NEC in-
troduced its V20/V30 series of compatible microprocessors.8 5 Intel ac-
cused NEC of copying its 8086/88 microcodes in the production of its V-
series microprocessors. 86 Anticipating litigation, NEC took the offensive
and filed suit against Intel in late 1984 seeking a judicial declaration that
Intel's copyrights for its 8086/88 microprocessors were invalid and that,
in any event, NEC's V-series microprocessors did not infringe Intel's
8086/88 microprocessor copyrights.8 7 In response, Intel filed counter-
claims against NEC for infringement.
88
77. See Menell, supra note 4. See also Chandler, supra note 2.
78. See Chandler, supra note 2. See also Comment, supra note 16.
79. Pollack, Intel Loses Copyright Case to NEC, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1989, at Dl, col. 6.
80. 'Frankel, Big Suits, THE AM. LAW., Apr. 1989, at 23.
81. NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1181. Between 1979 and 1981,
Intel granted licenses to Harris, Matra-Harris and Siemens.
82. Id. at 1178.
83. Id. at 1181.
84. Id. at 1189. Intel licensed NEC to use the 8086/88 microprocessor hardware which
was protected by patent. NEC created a microcode which could operate within this licensed
hardware.
85. Glenn, New Arrival; NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp. Rules of the Game, REV. PUBLICATIONS
Co., Apr. 1989, vol. 7, no. 4, at 30.
86. Id.
87. NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1177.
88. Id.
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The litigation continued for approximately four and one-half years.
Initially, the case was assigned to Judge Ingram for determination. How-
ever, two years into the litigation, he disqualified himself from the case
after NEC challenged his fitness on the grounds that a conflict of interest
existed due to his ownership of a modest amount of Intel stock.89 Prior
to removing himself, Judge Ingram had made a preliminary ruling that
Intel's 8086/88 microcode was subject to protection under the Copyright
Act.9" He had further ruled that Intel did not lose its copyright protec-
tion by its licensee's omission of copyright notice on publicly distributed
copies of the microprocessors. 9 It was at this point that NEC played its
ace and challenged Judge Ingram's fitness in order to set aside these dam-
aging preliminary rulings by his disqualification. In early 1987, the case
was reassigned to Judge William P. Gray.
In February 1989, after rehearing the case, Judge Gray rendered a
decision addressing four primary issues: (1) whether Intel's 8086/88
microcode was subject to copyright protection under the Copyright Act;
(2) whether Intel forfeited such protection by virtue of its licensees' omis-
sion of copyright notice on publicly distributed microprocessors; (3)
whether NEC's V-series microcode infringed Intel's 8086/88 copyrights;
and (4) whether NEC's V-series microprocessors were no more than im-
provements on its Intel-licensed products. In rendering his decision,
Judge Gray produced an explicit and detailed record of his examination
of the extensive evidence produced by NEC and Intel at trial. It is clear
from this record that both parties undertook painstaking efforts to edu-
cate Judge Gray on the intricacies of microcode technology. NEC alone
produced scores of demonstrative exhibits which ranged from the funda-
mental teachings of basic logic design and computer terminology to a
series of "Highlighted Microcode Comparison Books," which provided
NEC's version of the similarities and differences between the Intel
microcode and the NEC clone. 92 Although an NEC attorney admitted
that "even an expert would have trouble" understanding the information
provided in these exhibits, NEC maintains that the color-highlighted
comparison books "made it relatively simple for the judge to understand
89. Brandt & Gross, The Uncertain Payoffs from Intel's Landmark Case, Bus. WK., Feb
20, 1989, at 35 ("[lIngram belonged to an investment club that owned $80 worth of Intel stock
in his name."); Groenwald, NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp. Rules of the Game, REV. PUBLICATIONS
Co., April, 1989, vol. 7, no. 4, at 30.
90. Brandt & Gross, supra note 89.
91. Id.
92. Derwin, NEC v. Intel: The Scope of Copyright Protection, COMPUTER LAW., March,
1989, at 1.
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at a glance the range of similarities and differences contained in any given
microroutine.
' 93
With respect to the copyrightability of microcode, Judge Gray con-
cluded that Intel's microprograms were proper subject matter for protec-
tion under the Copyright Act.94 In coming to this determination, he
relied primarily on the Third Circuit's decision in Apple Computers, Inc.
v. Franklin Computer Corp. which held that a computer program is af-
forded copyright protection regardless of the medium in, which it is ex-
pressed.95 Judge Gray, however, also concluded that Intel had forfeited
its copyright protection of the 8086/88 microprocessors by its failure to
ensure that its licensees were affixing copyright notices on the
microprocessors that were being publicly distributed.96 This ruling was
contrary to Judge Ingram's prior decision. In addition, Intel was found
dilatory in its discovery of the omission and that it failed to take reason-
able steps to add such notice once the omission was discovered.97
As to the issue of infringement, Intel had to'establish -that NEC had
access to the copyrighted microcodes and that substantial similarities ex-
isted between the Intel 8086/88 and NEC's V-series microprograms.
98
93. Id.
94. NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10'U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1180.
95. Id. NEC argued that "Intel's microcode is a defining element of the computer itself,"
and therefore not a "computer program" as defined within the Copyright Act. However,
Judge Gray dismissed this, as a "semi-semantical argument" by NEC and concluded that
microcode comes within the statutory definition as "a set of statements or instructions to be
used .... in a computer." Id. at 1179.
96. Id. at 1180. (Approximately 10.6% of the 28 million microcode copies distributed to
the public between May 1,978 and May 1986 did not contain copyright notice. Judge Gray
found this amount to exceed the "relatively small number" of copies that may be exempted
from the notice requirement.) It would appear, however, that such notice was required for the
benefit of the public purchasing the copyrighted products and unaware of Intel's proprietary
interest. NEC, on the other hand, had actual knowledge of Intel's copyright from the licensing
agreement. NEC should therefore not have been permitted-to take advantage of Intel's failure
to ensure that notice was affixed to the distributed products.
97. Id. at 1181-83. Judge Gray found that Intel displayed a. "lack.of active concern" in
protecting its 8086/88 microcode copyrights. Although Intel's initial licensing agreements
provided that copyright notice would be placed on its licensed products upon written request,
Intel made no such request until April 1985, several months after litigation began. Intel's
licensing agreements with NEC, Fujitsu and Mitsubishi contained absolutely no provision re-
quiring copyright notice. Intel did not inquire as to NEC's notice procedures until early Sep-
tember 1984. Intel did not actively investigate this matter until February 1985, when it
purchased Fujitsu and NEC products on the open market for the purpose of checking for
copyright notice as part of its preparation for this litigation. Once Intel discovered that no
copyright notice was being placed on its licensed products, Intel sent a letter to Fujitsu stating
that its license required notice to be placed on its products. Intel sent stickers bearing its
copyright notice to Fujitsu requesting that it affix them to the licensed devices. However, Intel
failed to make any follow-up inquiries whether Fujitsu was affixing the stickers. Judge Gray
found that this corrective action was insufficient to save Intel's copyright protection.
98. Id. at 1183. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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Since NEC had been licensed to use the copyrighted Intel 8086/88
microcode, NEC did not dispute that it had access to the protected
microprogram. 99 In determining whether substantial similarities between
the two microprograms existed, Judge Gray explicitly applied the "ordi-
nary observer" standard generally used in literary copyright cases. 1°°
Based on his examination of the two programs, as well as the conflicting
expert testimony and the exhibits presented at trial, Judge Gray ruled
that "the ordinary observer, considering the accused microcode as a
whole, would not recognize it as having been taken from the copyrighted
source."
10 1
However, in examining the microprograms, Judge Gray did dis-
cover that several of the shorter microroutines contained in the NEC
microcodes were substantially similar to Intel's 8086/88 codes and war-
ranted further examination as to evidence of actual copying by NEC. °2
Intel claimed that NEC's programmer must have copied the Intel
microcode because he was relatively inexperienced in microprogram-
ming, worked under an arduous time schedule, and failed to adequately
document his work as compared to other programs he had developed. 103
Finding the testimony of the NEC programmer extremely credible, how-
ever, Judge Gray concluded that he had not copied the Intel
microcode." This conclusion was in direct contradiction to the NEC
programmer's testimonial admission at trial that he had previously disas-
sembled the Intel microcode and had been influenced by this experience
in creating the V-series microcode.10 5 Judge Gray dismissed this evi-
dence on the grounds that "[s]uch experience inevitably became part of
his expertise, and the acquired knowledge of how [Intel's programmer]
created instructions to be executed by the 8086/8088 may well have been
a source of ideas that [NEC's programmer] utilized in preparing a
microcode for the [V-series]," and did not compel a contrary
conclusion. 106
In further support of its direct copying argument, Intel introduced
evidence that the first version of NEC's microprogram duplicated entire
99. Id.




104. Id. At trial, an interpreter was required to translate the testimony of the NEC
programmer. It is questionable whether Judge Gray should have placed such weight on the
NEC programmer's credibility when Judge Gray had to rely heavily upon the interpreter's
skill in conveying the witness' responses to questioning.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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segments of Intel's copyrighted code. 10 7 Judge Gray ruled, however, that
even assuming NEC's programmer directly copied the Intel microcode
he had previously disassembled, NEC's final version of the
microprogram was sufficiently altered so that it did not infringe Intel's
copyright. 0 8 Judge Gray explicitly applied the well-established copy-
right principle used in literary cases which states that "[c]opying deleted
or so disguised as to be unrecognizable is not copying."109 In so ruling,
Judge Gray effectively withdrew the copyright protection he had earlier
afforded microcodes under the Copyright Act. Essentially, Judge Gray
extended copyright protection to microcodes with one hand while strip-
ping that protection with the other hand by providing a means for direct
copying by subsequent alteration.
Contending that the similarities between the two microcodes were a
result of the limited ways a microcode could be written to produce the
desired result, NEC introduced an imaginative piece of demonstrative
evidence.110 NEC performed a "clean room" cloning experiment for the
court whereby isolated engineers disassembled Intel's 8086/88 microcode
into written specifications. Programmers, previously unexposed to the
copyrighted information, were then given these written specifications and
instructed to create a new microcode that would perform the same func-
tions as required in the licensed Intel hardware. The microcode created
by this method was strikingly similar to the Intel 8086/88 microcode.111
Judge Gray found the "clean room" microcode "compelling evidence"
that the similarities between the NEC and Intel microcodes were due to
technical and hardware constraints, not copying.112 In light of these con-
straints, Judge Gray held that since the "shorter, simpler microroutines
can be expressed in only a few limited ways,"" 3 they "may be protected
only against virtually identical copying.""' 4 Based upon the evidence,
Judge Gray concluded that "NEC had properly used the underlying
ideas, without virtually identically copying their limited expression."115
107. Id. at 1185. The NEC V/20 microcode also contained a "patch" similar to the Intel
8088 microcode, used by Intel to overcome an error in the 8088 microprocessor hardware.
Intel contended that there was no independent reason for NEC to have included the "patch"
and that this clearly evidenced copying. Judge Gray, however, ruled that NEC was licensed to
use the 8088 hardware design and was therefore required to write a similar "patch" that would
run in the V/20 hardware based on the 8088 design. Id.
108. Id. at 1186-87.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1186.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1188.




Although Judge Gray's acceptance of the "clean room" microcode
as compelling evidence that NEC did not copy Intel's copyrighted
microcode appears to be a validation of the reverse-engineering technique
for software cloning, his decision has an even greater impact. NEC's
programmer was not a "virgin" microprogrammer, previously unex-
posed to the copyrighted material from which he based his independent
design of the V-series compatible microcode. 16 Rather, the NEC
programmer had disassembled Intel's microcode in his preparation for
writing a program that would perform the same functions as the Intel
copyrighted version." 7 In ruling that this procedure did not constitute
infringement, Judge Gray appears to have also validated a "dirty room"
method of cloning copyrighted computer programs.
1 18
Ironically, by the time the decision was ultimately rendered, it did
not have a significant impact on either NEC or Intel. At the time the suit
was initiated, NEC had abandoned its production of V-series
microprocessors because it believed the cloning process was fraught with
difficulty and because the V-series simply was not compatible with Intel's
newer products.' 19 The Intel 8086/88 was also displaced by new genera-
tions of microcodes.1 20 Currently, the 8086/88 represents less than 1%
of Intel's approximately $30 million in annual revenues.
1 21
At the time of publication, neither Intel nor NEC have filed an ap-
peal. Intel has indicated, however, that it is considering the possibility of
such an option.1 22 Should an appeal be taken, this protracted litigation
could continue well into the mid-1990s without a. final resolution.
Although Judge Gray's decision presently forecloses recovery of dam-
ages by Intel against NEC, the Ninth Circuit could overrule the decision
requiring NEC to pay Intel actual damages as well as any profits NEC
realized by its unauthorized use of the Intel microcodes.
23
II
Informal, Private Arbitration: Offering the Olive
Branch
At the same time the NEC/Intel litigation was heating up in federal
court, IBM and Fujitsu commenced *private arbitration proceedings to
116. Id. at 1184.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Sieg, supra note 44.
120. Pollack, supra note 79.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
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resolve licensing and copyright infringement disputes similar to those in-
volved in the NEC/Intel lawsuit.
A. The IBM/Fujitsu Controversy
International Business Machines Corporation ("IBM") is the
world's largest computer company, controlling approximately 70% of
the world market in mainframe computers.124 Fujitsu Limited
("Fujitsu") ranks fourth in the world and is Japan's largest computer
manufacturer.125 Among its computer products, Fujitsu develops and
markets IBM-compatible mainframe computers and related software.126
Both firms compete in the world market for mainframe computers and
related products in Asia, Australia, New Zealand, Europe, and Brazil. 27
In the early 1960s, IBM developed a new series of mainframe com-
puters known as the System 360 which contained operating system
software that could run a great variety of application programs originally
designed for other IBM computers. 2 s The System 360 allowed consum-
ers to expand and modify their existing computer systems without having
to invest in costly new application programs.1 29 Once consumers com-
mitted themselves to the System 360, IBM was guaranteed future sales of
mainframe computers and related products since IBM was the only man-
ufacturer that offered compatible products. In effect, IBM owned a legal
monopoly created by its new operating system software. 13
0
By the time Fujitsu entered the computer mainframe market, the
IBM/System 360 had achieved widespread acceptance with mainframe
computer users. The majority of these users were locked into the IBM
environment by making extensive investment in application programs
designed to run in conjunction with the System 360 operating system
software.13 1 In order to effectively compete with IBM, Fujitsu had to
develop an operating system that could run the same application pro-
grams as the IBM system. 132 In 1976, Fujitsu marketed its first IBM-
compatible mainframe computer system.
133
124. L.A. Times, Sept. 16, 1987, Part 4, at 2, col. 1; International Business Machines Corp.
v. Fujitsu Ltd., No. 13T-1 17-0636-85, Am. Arb. Assoc. Commercial Arb. Tribunal Opinion, 1,
Sept. 15, 1987 (R. Mnookin and J. Jones) [hereinafter IBM/Fujitsu Opinion].
125. L.A. Times, supra note 124; IBM/Fujitsu Opinion, supra note 124, at 1.
126. Coy, supra note 6.
127. Id.
128. IBM/Fujitsu Opinion, supra note 124, at 4.
129. Id.
130. See Comment, supra note 16.
131. IBM/Fujitsu Opinion, supra note 124, at 5.
132. See Comment, supra note 16.
133. IBM/Fujitsu Opinion, supra note 124, at 5.
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At the time, IBM did not claim any copyright protection since it
was unclear whether operating system software was protected by the ex-
isting copyright laws.' 34 Following the passage of the Copyright Act of
1976, IBM began registering copyrights for its new software. 3 5 By that
time, however, Fujitsu had already committed itself to offering IBM-
compatible operating systems. 136 Subsequently, after Congress passed the
Software Protection Act of 1982, which specifically extended copyright
protection to computer programs, IBM accused Fujitsu of violating its
operating system copyrights.
137
In an attempt to resolve their disputes, IBM and Fujitsu entered a
settlement agreement in 1983 ("1983 Settlement Agreement").1 38 Pursu-
ant to the 1983 Settlement Agreement, IBM agreed to waive all its claims
against Fujitsu for copyright infringement in consideration for Fujitsu's
payment of an estimated $65 million in licensing fees. 13 9 This payment
was based on Fujitsu's previous distribution And use of certain Fujitsu
programs containing portions of IBM copyrighted material. Fujitsu also
agreed to pay over $406 million in semi-annual licensing fees for the fu-
ture use of these "designated" programs."4 The 1983 Settlement Agree-
ment also provided for the exchange of certain external programming
information between the parties. Although a separate "External Infor-
mation" Agreement was drawn-up and executed, the exhibits listing the
programs to be exchanged, as well as the licensing fee schedule, were
never completed.' 4 '
Due to "fundamental ambiguities and inadequacies" in the 1983 Set-
tlement Agreement and the incomplete External Information Agree-
ment, new disputes arose between the parties. 142  Although they
struggled for several months to negotiate a resolution, IBM and Fujitsu
were unable to come to any agreement. 43 Consequently, in June of
1985, IBM filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) alleging that Fujitsu had breached its obligations
under the 1983 Settlement Agreement and violated IBM's operating sys-
134. Id. at 5-6.
135. Id. at 6.
136. Id.
137. Id. See also Coy, supra note 6.
138. IBM/Fujitsu Opinion, supra note 124, at 6.
139. American Arbitration Association Press Release, Nov. 29, 1989 [hereinafter AAA
Press Release].
140. Id.
141. IBM/Fujitsu Opinion, supra note 124, at 7.
142. Id. at 7-8.
143. Id. at 8.
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tem copyrights."' Specifically, IBM alleged that Fujitsu had "systemati-
cally and pervasively" copied IBM programming material in violation of
its copyrights of operating systems for its mainframe computers. 45 IBM
alleged that Fujitsu failed to develop its own programming material in
compliance with those rights and that it did not comply with the agreed-
upon protective procedures established by the 1983 Settlement Agree-
ment.' 46 IBM further alleged that Fujitsu, in breach of the 1983 Settle-
ment Agreement, failed to provide adequate safeguards for the use of the
designated IBM programming material and obstructed IBM's review
efforts. 1
47
In answer to these allegations, Fujitsu maintained that its use of
IBM programming material did not violate the 1983 Settlement Agree-
ment or IBM's intellectual property rights. 14  Fujitsu based its defense
on several alternative grounds. First, Fujitsu contended that the IBM
operating system programs at issue did not constitute protected expres-
sion as defined by the Copyright Act. Second, Fujitsu argued that such
IBM programs were in the public domain and therefore not protected by
copyright law since IBM had publicly distributed uncopyrighted versions
of the System 360 programs. Third, Fujitsu argued that its use of "exter-
nal information" was within the parameters intended by the 1983 Settle-
ment Agreement. Fourth, Fujitsu contended that the 1983 Settlement
Agreement provided Fujitsu with complete immunity as to its use of the
IBM copyrighted material. Fifth, Fujitsu argued that the protective pro-
cedures provided by the 1983 Settlement Agreement authorized Fujitsu's
research on high level architectural design, and sixth, that Fujitsu only
used standard programming techniques in the research and development
of its software.
49
Finally, Fujitsu insisted that certain portions of the IBM operating
system software had become "industry standards" and that, as such,
Fujitsu had the right to use it in the development of IBM-compatibles in
order to effectively compete in the mainframe computer market. 50
Fujitsu claimed that IBM had violated the antitrust laws by deliberately
pursuing a strategy to monopolize the mainframe computer market,
144. The 1983 Settlement Agreement provided that any disputes would be resolved
through arbitration. Id. See also Sanger, Fight Ends for IBM and Fujitsu, N.Y. Times, Sept.
16, 1987, at DI, col. 6.
145. IBM/Fujitsu Opinion, supra note 124, at 8.
146. Id. at 8-9.
147. Id. at 9.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 10.
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thereby effectively locking consumers into the IBM system.' 5' IBM re-
sisted these antitrust charges on the grounds that the need for "compati-
bility" does not entitle IBM's competitors to copy proprietary
information. 52 In its support, IBM cited numerous decisions in which
the courts consistently ruled in favor of IBM on similar antitrust charges
and claims of entitlement based on the alleged need for compatibility.
53
IBM further argued that, in any event, the information which Fujitsu
used was clearly not considered "indispensable" to the design of IBM-
compatibles.' 54 IBM contended that, due to Fujitsu's history of violating
IBM's proprietary rights, IBM should no longer be compelled by any
contractual obligation to provide Fujitsu with additional external
information. 155
B. The IBM/Fujitsu Arbitration
In December 1985, IBM and Fujitsu selected two arbitrators to re-
solve their disputes: Robert H. Mnookin, a Stanford Law School profes-
sor specializing in dispute resolution, and John J. Jones, a retired
executive from Norfolk Southern Corporation and a computer systems
expert.156 At the outset, the arbitrators announced that their goal was to
avoid becoming entangled in an "extensive adjudicatory factfinding pro-
cess."' 57 Accordingly, the arbitrators refused to engage in a program by
program comparison to determine whether Fujitsu had actually violated
any of IBM's intellectual property rights. Rather, they focused on
resolving the parties' ongoing disputes with respect to the 1983 Settle-
ment Agreement and Fujitsu's continuing use of IBM programming ma-
terial in its software development.
15 8
The arbitration proceedings consisted of four key stages: (1) hear-
ings on procedural claims; (2) "responsible executives" meetings; (3)
hearings on summary judgment motions; and (4) mediation of new IBM-





155. Id. at 11.
156. AAA Press Release, supra note 139. Initially, the arbitration panel consisted of three
members: an IBM-appointed arbitrator (Jones), a Fujitsu-appointed arbitrator (Mnookin), and
a third arbitrator appointed by the two party-appointed arbitrators. However, by written
agreement and stipulation, both IBM and Fujitsu agreed that the two party-appointed mem-
bers of the panel would serve as "neutral" arbitrators. Consequently, the third arbitrator re-
signed at that time. IBM/Fujitsu Opinion, supra note 124, at n.3.




procedural claims regarding jurisdiction and ripeness.'1 9 During the "re-
sponsible executives" meetings, the parties briefed and argued their posi-
tions before -the arbitrators and a panel. of select IBM and Fujitsu
executives concerning the nature of Fujitsu's software development pro-
cedures and whether such procedures violated IBM's rights under the
1983 Settlement Agreement. As expected, the parties took widely diver-
gent positions and were unable to resolve their fundamental disputes.
They did, however, agree on the identification of several "designated"
programs that were intended to be covered under the External Informa-
tion Agreement."6 In these meetings, Fujitsu also disclosed the methods
by which it used IBM programming information to develop its compati-
ble operating system software and the procedures it used to protect
IBM's copyrights. 6 I
At the hearings on summary judgment motions, both parties filed
briefs regarding the copyright claims of IBM's MVS Version 1.3 operat-
ing system, the legitimacy of Fujitsu's software development process, and
the nature and extent of each parties' obligations to exchange informa-
tion under the 1983 Settlement Agreement.' 62 IBM also filed a summary
judgment motion attacking Fujitsu's use of certain IBM programs re-
leased after 1983 and a motion claiming it was entitled to treble damages
under the 1983 Settlement Agreement. 6 3 Conversely, Fujitsu filed sum-
mary judgment motions claiming that Japanese, not U.S., copyright law
applied and that IBM had violated its direct licensing obligations under
the 1983 Settlement Agreement.'"
The arbitrators granted one of Fujitsu's motions, finding that IBM
had breached its direct licensing obligations under the 1.983 Settlement
Agreement.16 5 However, the arbitrators specifically refused to.consider
any motions concerning the scope of IBM's copyright protection.1 66 The
arbitators believed that the legal and factual issues involved in reaching
such a determination were so entangled that it could only be made in the
context of a dispute concerning a specific program. 6 7 They did, how-
159. Id. at 12-13.
160. Id. at 13-14.
161. Id. at 14.
162. Id. at 14-15.
163. Id.
164. Id. Although the 1983 Settlement Agreement provided that any disputes would be
subject to arbitration, it did not specify whether the ,intellectual property laws of Japan or the
United States would apply. By stipulation, Fujitsu agreed to submit all claims to the jurisdic-
tion of the American Arbitration Association. However, this did not foreclose the application
of Japanese law to the dispute by the American Arbitrators.
165. Id. at 15.
166. Id.
167. Id. at n.19.
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ever, order an accounting by Fujitsu with respect to the revenues derived
from all programs which Fujitsu considered to be covered by the 1983
Settlement Agreement.1
68
It was not until the mediation stage that IBM and Fujitsu were fi-
nally able to arrive at a comprehensive resolution of their disputes, exe-
cuting two new substantive agreements. 169 The first of these agreements
was executed in December 1986 (the "1986 Agreement") and resolved
the parties' disputes as to which programs were "designated" for use by
Fujitsu under the 1983 Settlement Agreement. 70 Pursuant to the 1986
Agreement, IBM granted Fujitsu a "paid-up" license covering its past
use of the designated programs, as well as hundreds of additional pro-
grams.17  In return, Fujitsu agreed to pay a substantial licensing fee of
approximately $400 million. 72 The 1986 Agreement settled IBM's
copyright infringement claims as to hundreds of Fujitsu programs as well
as Fujitsu's past use of IBM programming material in the development of
IBM-compatibles. 
73
The second agreement was executed in February 1987 (the "Wash-
ington Agreement"). It settled all of the remaining disputes between
IBM and Fujitsu and provided a framework for enforcing the protective
procedures for copyrighted programming materials established under the
earlier 1983 Settlement Agreement. 174  Pursuant to the Washington
Agreement, Fujitsu agreed to pay an annual "access" fee, to be deter-
mined by the arbitrators, for the future right to use the designated pro-
grams containing IBM programming. 17  This supplanted the previous
1983 licensing agreement between the parties. 7 6 In addition, each party
168. IBM/Fujitsu Opinion, supra note 124, at 15.
169. IBM and Fujitsu also executed an agreement which provided that any further disputes
between the parties arising from the order or the previous agreements would be submitted to
arbitration by Mnookin and Jones. Id. at n.20.
170. Id. at 16.
171. Id. In total, the paid-up license covered 903 programs. Id.
172. AAA Press Release, supra note 139. Fujitsu received a credit of about $33.8 million
to be applied toward the paid-up license for overpayments made to IBM under the 1983 Settle-
ment Agreement. Fujitsu also received credit of approximately $124.8 million toward the
paid-up license payments made between 1983 and 1987. In total, Fujitsu will have paid IBM
slightly over about $833.2 million for its use of the designated programs. Since Fujitsu has
already paid a substantial portion of this amount, it will only be required to pay to IBM a
balance of approximately $237.2 million. Id.
173. IBM/Fujitsu Opinion, supra note 124, at 16.
174. Id. at n.20.
175. AAA Press Release, supra note 139; IBM/Fujitsu Opinion, supra note 124, at 17. "In
1989, Fujitsu will pay between $25,671,000 and $51,342,000 depending on the extent of
Fujitsu's access." AAA Press Release, supra note 139.
176. IBM/Fujitsu Opinion, supra note 124, at 17.
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agreed to license its respective operating systems software for use in the
other's mainframe computer hardware.177
The Washington Agreement further provided for the establishment
of a "Secured Facility" regime to allow controlled use of programming
material by both parties in their software development while protecting
their respective intellectual property rights. 78 Due to the parties' inabil-
ity to agree on the details of the Secured Facility regime, the arbitrators
issued an order in September 1987, setting forth the regime's procedural
requirements. 79 The Secured Facility regime was designed to accom-
plish four basic objectives: (1) adequate compensation for access to pro-
prietary information; (2) independent monitoring by a neutral expert for
compliance with the arbitrator's decision; (3) immunity from challenge
by the other party; and (4) a limited period of time in which to examine
the other party's programming information."8 ° This regime was intended
as a preventive approach to dispute resolution by setting the parameters
for the exchange of information while implementing appropriate safe-
guards to avoid misappropriation of any proprietary information.'
The most remarkable aspect of the Washington Agreement is its ex-
tensive grant of authority to the arbitrators to define the intellectual
property rights that otherwise might not be protected under the existing
copyright laws, and to resolve any disputes which might arise between
the parties in the future. Essentially, the Washington Agreement "em-
powers the Arbitrators to create a coerced license, to determine the infor-
mation covered by such license and to specify the price and enforcement
terms," during the next five to ten years.'8 2 The arbitrators have contin-
uing jurisdiction over all disputes between IBM and Fujitsu well into the
year 2002.83
III
The IBM/Fujitsu Arbitration and the NEC/Intel
Litigation Compared
Private arbitration is a particularly attractive means of dispute reso-
lution in the context of software copyright conflicts because of its infor-
177. Id. at 17-18.
178. Id. at 18. To date, only Fujitsu has established a secured facility to evaluate IBM's
software although IBM also has the same right to review Fujitsu programs.
179. International Business Machines Corp. v. Fujitsu Limited, No. 13T- 117-0636-85, Am.
Arb. Assoc. Commercial Arb. Order, Sept. 15, 1987 (R. Mnookin and J. Jones) [hereinafter
IBM/Fujitsu Order].
180. IBM/Fujitsu Opinion, supra note 124, at 25-26.
181. Id. at 22.
182. Id. at 18.
183. AAA Press Release, supra note 139.
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mal and pliable characteristics. It has no set, definite process, and the
procedure itself is inherently flexible because it allows the parties to de-
sign their own resolution procedure to fit the particular controversy.' 4
The parties may provide for only limited discovery and may even forego
the perfunctory law and motion process of the legal system altogether. 8 5
In addition, the arbitrators are not bound by any legal precedent. They
are not required to apply the strict exclusionary rules of evidence and
may be strongly influenced by the equitable merits of each party's
case.186 Because they are not constrained by substantive or procedural
rules, the arbitrators possess the authority to define the legal rights of the
parties and can fashion remedies that specifically address the issues
which confront them.
18 7
The form of arbitration employed by IBM and Fujitsu in resolving
their licensing and copyright disputes was voluntary, combining both
formal and informal proceedings. Pursuant to their 1983 Settlement
Agreement, IBM and Fujitsu had agreed to submit their disputes to arbi-
tration prior to any controversy arising between the parties.'8 8 During
the arbitration, formal hearings were conducted, dispensing with proce-
dural claims and summary judgment motions. 8 9 Private informal meet-
ings were also held between "responsible executives" of IBM and Fujitsu
in an attempt to negotiate a final resolution.' 90 The most successful stage
of these proceedings occurred during the intense negotiations which were
mediated by the arbitrators.' 9 These mediated negotiations resulted in
the execution of new comprehensive agreements structured in a manner
which permit IBM and Fujitsu to maintain an ongoing business relation-
ship while adequately protecting their respective intellectual property
rights.' 92
By combining formal and informal procedures, IBM and Fujitsu
created a "hybrid" form of arbitration, thereby escaping arduous court-
room formalities while retaining a structured environment. They were
184. See HANCOCK, CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES 2.001 (1989); GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S
GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1979); HARTER, POINTS ON A CONTINUUM: DIS-
PUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS, FEDERAL AGENCY
USE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 311 (1986).
185. See GOLDBERG, supra note 184.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. IBM/Fujitsu Opinion, supra note 124, at I & nn.1,2.
189. Id. at 12-15.
190. Id. at 13.
191. Id. at 16.
192. See Nakajima, IBM-Fuj'tsu Settlement Affects Global Industry, The Nihon Keizai
Shimbun Japan Economic J., Dec. 10, 1988, at 4.
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able to produce an atmosphere where they could informally negotiate
their claims yet benefit from the guidance of the arbitrators acting as
expert mediators. The principle of cooperation and the objective of set-
tlement were constantly emphasized throughout the proceedings. The
flexibility of the arbitration environment permitted these underlying poli-
cies to thrive.
In contrast, the trial and pre-trial proceedings of the NEC/Intel liti-
gation exemplified the adversarial system at its worst. The two parties
pitted legions of legal and computer experts against each other, engaged
in exhaustive discovery, and flooded the courtroom with an astounding
volume of technical exhibits and legal briefs.193 Cumulatively, both sides
expended millions of dollars in attorneys' fees and computer expert fees
while the microcodes at issue became antiquated. 94 Although the trial
consumed only eighteen courtroom days, the actual litigation was pro-
tracted over a period of four and one-half years. 9 NEC's challenge to
Judge Ingram's fitness is only one example of the procedural maneuvers
by which a litigant can delay the trial in such a complicated case. If
appeals are taken by either party, final resolution of this case cannot be
expected before the mid-1990s.
IBM and Fujitsu were not obliged to engage in the exhaustive and
expensive discovery process which Intel and NEC underwent.' 96 Addi-
tionally, the parties will not be forced to bear the cost of an extensive
appellate procedure similar to that which Intel and NEC will probably be
subjected. However, it would be improper to overestimate or overgener-
alize the cost savings of the IBM/Fujitsu arbitration. Similar to Intel
and NEC, they too retained expert legal counsel and computer consul-
tants to marshal the facts, organize and analyze the documents,, and in-
terview witnesses in preparation for the arbitration hearings.197 In fact,
IBM and Fujitsu engaged in several educational sessions in which both
parties briefed and argued their positions to the arbitrators and selected
"responsible executives."' 9 They also produced numerous legal briefs
and exhibits in support oftheir procedural claims and summary judg-
ment motions.' 99
In comparison to the NEC/Intel litigation, however, the IBM/
Fujitsu arbitration was a relatively expedient process. In the context of
193. See Derwin, supra note 92, at 4-5.
194. See Brandt & Gross, supra note 89.
195. Pollack, supra note 79.
196. IBM/Fujitsu Opinion, supra note 124, at 11 ("It has been the goal of the panel to
avoid becoming engulfed in an extensive adjudicative fact-finding process.").
197. See id. at 12.
198. Id. at 13.
199. Id. at 14.
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computer copyright, this is very appealing since obsolescence is endemic
to computer technology and the money spent in litigating an infringe-
ment suit tends to dwarf the actual investment made in the software
product.2" The NEC/Intel litigation continued so long that the actual
microcodes at issue were largely displaced by new generations of
microchips by the time the decision was finally rendered. The disputed
designs today represent only 1% of Intel's $2.9 billion in annual reve-
nues.2"' Moreover, NEC discontinued its cloning process of the Intel
microcode at the outset of the litigation because of its expense and the
fact that the microprograms produced were ultimately incompatible with
Intel's new generation of software products.20 2 The IBM/Fujitsu arbi-
tration, on the other hand, concluded within nineteen months after its
commencement and the parties are still engaged in a mutually beneficial
exchange of information. After such a bitter legal battle, which will
probably continue on appeal, it is unlikely that Intel and NEC will en-
gage in any business dealings with each other in the near future.
Another advantage to the selection of commercial arbitration by
IBM and Fujitsu was the privacy of the resolution process. Typically,
the decision of an arbitration panel consists of an award which makes no
further elaboration on the facts of the dispute or the individual issues
involved.20 3 In selecting arbitration, IBM and Fujitsu explicitly provided
that all information concerning the arbitration and settlement agree-
ments would be kept confidential. 21 Pursuant to orders of the arbitra-
tors, the parties and their counsel are strictly prohibited from making
any public speculation about the impact of the decision and may not
disclose any additional information concerning the proceedings or the
dispute.20 5 Although the IBM/Fujitsu Opinion and Order provide a rel-
atively thorough discussion of the dispute and its resolution, it does not
disclose any detailed information concerning the software programs in-
volved or the testimony and exhibits presented at the hearings.20 6 In the
NEC/Intel litigation, however, Judge Gray was obliged to set forth a
complete and detailed record of all bases upon which he made his deci-
200. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
201. Brandt & Gross, supra note 89.
202. Sieg, supra note 44.
203. GOLDBERG, supra note 184, at 63, 66.
204. IBM/Fujitsu Opinion, supra note 124, at 28.
205. AAA Press Release, supra note 139. The IBM/Fujitsu Opinion further states that the
"[a]rbitrators are responsible for enforcing the confidentiality rule. This is an appropriate time
to disclose to the public the Order and its background. The Arbitrators intend to make further
disclosures at appropriate times in the future. Meanwhile, the parties and their counsel remain
obligated to make no disclosure concerning the arbitration proceedings." IBM/Fujitsu Opin-
ion, supra note 124, at 28.
206. IBM/Fujitsu Opinion, supra note 124, at 28.
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sion. Moreover, all of the information disclosed during the trial and
pre-trial proceedings is considered to fall within the public domain and is
therefore available to anyone upon request.
20 8
By utilizing the arbitration process, IBM and Fujitsu were also able
to select the arbitrators who decided their case. In doing so, they chose
individuals not only in whom they had confidence but who possessed the
requisite technical and legal expertise to make a knowledgeable decision
in the context of a complex computer copyright dispute. Although IBM
and Fujitsu produced numerous legal briefs and exhibits during the arbi-
tration, Mnookin and Jones were able to comprehend the technical as-
pects of the case and facilitate a speedy resolution because of their
expertise in the fields of computer operating systems and dispute resolu-
tion. This allowed the dispute to be resolved on the merits as opposed to
attending a lengthy technical tutorial of the factfinder.
In the NEC/Intel litigation, a considerable portion of time was
spent educating Judge Gray as to the basics of computer design and ter-
minology, as well as the intricacies of programming logic and software
development. 2°9 Although Judge Gray's decision demonstrates a relative
understanding of microprocessor technology, it seems unlikely that he
understood the science of microcodes sufficiently to render an informed
determination on whether NEC's microcode actually infringed Intel's
copyrighted microprogram or whether the "clean room" reverse-engi-
neering technique was a legitimate method of cloning copyrighted
software.210 Considering the complexity of microprogramming, it is diffi-
cult to believe that an individual unfamiliar with the basic terminology
and logic design of computer programs can absorb the requisite technical
expertise during litigation necessary to determine the issues with which
Judge Gray was confronted.21'
More importantly, even after Intel and NEC had tutored Judge
Gray on the technology of microprogramming, he was nevertheless
obliged to apply simplistic copyright principles which are inappropriate
in the context of computer software. 212 Bound by legal precedent, Judge
Gray made his determination that NEC's microprogram was not sub-
stantially similar to Intel's copyrighted version based on the "ordinary
observer" standard.213 Although the hypothetical "ordinary observer"
may be able to detect copying in simple literary works, it is unlikely that
207. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 6:6 (1989).
208. Id.
209. NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1184.
210. Id.
211. See Conley & Bryan, supra note 3, at 78.
212. Id. at 109.
213. NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1184.
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such a factfinder, particularly one unfamiliar with computer software,
can detect copying by comparing competing programs that are written in
object or source code.2" 4 Moreover, it seems inefficient to educate the
factfinder as to the technology of programming and then compel him or
her to apply a standard which assumes the factfinder is unfamiliar with
the technical aspects of the copyrighted work. Additionally, Judge Gray
applied the principle commonly used in literary copyright cases which
holds that a copy that is substantially changed will avoid infringement.2 5
Since programs can be altered quickly and easily, such a rule of law does
not adequately protect the extensive investment that a firm makes in the
research and development of a program, investment which is generally
not expended in the creation of the traditional forms of literary works.
Yet, Judge Gray rendered a decision based on these general copyright
principles without even addressing in his written opinion the appropri-
ateness of these standards to works embodied in high technology.
2 16
Conversely, Mnookin and Jones were not bound by such legal prece-
dent and proceeded to define the proprietary rights of IBM and Fujitsu
in the subject software based on their' expertise and the equitable merits
of the case. They discarded the conventional copyright principles as im-
proper in the software copyright context and addressed the practical as-
pects of the copyright and licensing issues before them. By creating their
own definition of software copyright protection, Mnookin and Jones
designed a remedy which fit the needs of both parties. Using their exper-
tise, they devised the Secured Facility regime which protects the proprie-
tary interests in the operating system software that otherwise may not
have been afforded protection under the existing copyright laws. As a
preventative approach, the regime sets up elaborate procedural safe-
guards for the use of proprietary information in the development of com-
patible software while simultaneously establishing a sophisticated
mechanism for resolving outstanding conflicts between IBM and Fujitsu,
thereby avoiding any future litigation. In doing so, the arbitrators cre-
ated a framework by which the parties could engage in a beneficial ex-
change of information yet protect their respective intellectual property
rights.
Unconstrained by either substantive or procedural laws, the arbitra-
tors were also able to protect the public interest involved in the IBM/
Fujitsu controversy. They established the Secured Facility regime with
the intent of promoting competition in the mainframe data processing
214. See Conley & Bryan, supra note 3.
215. NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1186-87.
216. Id.
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industry.2"7 By allowing Fujitsu access to otherwise protected IBM pro-
gramming information, Fujitsu can independently develop IBM-compat-
ible software, thereby strengthening its ability to compete in the
marketplace.21 8 IBM can also develop new enhancements and improve-
ments to its software products without the fear that Fujitsu will misap-
propriate such innovations and improvements. This competition will in
turn provide consumers with a wider variety of software products from
which to choose. As described by the arbitrators, consumers may assem-
ble data processing systems which utilize products purchased from com-
peting software firms in order to maximize performance and economy,
while taking advantage of the unique capabilities offered by certain prod-
ucts outside their mainframe system.21 9
By their decision, the arbitrators also attempted to foster competi-
tion with respect to IBM-compatible mainframe hardware systems.
220
The Washington Agreement provides that IBM and Fujitsu will license
their respective software products to be used in the other's hardware sys-
tems.221 Previously, consumers were only permitted to use IBM software
products in IBM hardware systems. The same restriction applied to the
use of Fujitsu software products in its hardware.222 Now, consumers
may use both IBM and Fujitsu software products interchangeably with
the hardware systems they have purchased from either firm. 223 The arbi-
trators intended for consumers to benefit from the "enhanced opportu-
nity to purchase the most desirable hardware products that either
company can offer."
224
Pursuant to the Washington Agreement, the arbitrators' subsequent
decisions will constitute the applicable intellectual property law between
the two firms until the year 2002.225 By providing arbitrators with such
extensive power, IBM and Fujitsu circumvented the expense and futility
of civil litigation. However, the parties in essence have also waived all
the constitutional protections provided by discovery and appeal.
226 Of
217. IBM/Fujitsu Opinion, supra note 124, at 26.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 27.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 17-18.
222. Id. at 27.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 28.
225. AAA Press Release, supra note 139.
226. The waiver does not include those appeals to vacate or modify based upon abuse of
discretion and fraud. For example, the provision of the U.S. Arbitration Act pertaining to
judicial review is extremely limited:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein
the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of
any party to the arbitration -
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course, parties may provide for extensive discovery to be a part of the
arbitration procedure, but the loss of the right to appeal is an extreme,
yet typical, characteristic of arbitration. With binding, non-appealable
arbitration, the parties will be burdened with the decision of the arbitra-
tors whether they agree with it or not. In the case of IBM and Fujitsu,
the companies will not only be compelled to accept the final order in the
present dispute, but any future determinations which the arbitrators con-
clude are necessary until the year 2002. Understandably, many com-
puter firms may not wish to relinquish such power over their businesses
to a panel of arbitrators and risk an unfavorable, non-appealable deci-
sion. However, it may be a greater business risk to elect litigation and
the uncertanties of existing copyright law determined by an unpredict-
able and uninformed judge or jury.
Finally, arbitration of disputes involving intellectual property rights
presents a particularly difficult problem in relation to its enforceability.
It has been suggested that a fundamental conflict exists in placing contro-
versies that concern public law in the hands of a private system of dispute
resolution.227 For instance, prior to 1989, the courts would not enforce
arbitration agreements involving patents due to the overriding public in-
terest concerning patent validity or infringement. 228 However, recent
Supreme Court decisions in this area have consistently favored the en-
forcement of such arbitration agreements, even in such federally regu-
lated areas as patents, antitrust, and securities laws.229 Consistent with
this trend, the Seventh Circuit recently held in Saturday Evening Post Co.
v. Kumbleseat Press, Inc. that copyright disputes over validity and in-
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hear-
ing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and mate-
rial to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the
award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing
by the arbitrators.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1987).
227. Shell, The Role of Public Law in Private Dispute Resolution: Reflections on Shearsoni
American Express v. McMahon, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 397 (1988).
228. ORKIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARBITRATION, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
TECHNIQUES 2.115 (1989).
229. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105
S.Ct. 3346 (1985); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, reh'g denied,
108 S.Ct. 31 (1987).
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fringement are arbitrable.23' Hence, arbitration agreements such as that
involved in the IBM/Fujitsu controversy will most likely be enforceable.
IV
Conclusion
Current copyright law does not provide adequate legal safeguards to
protect the intellectual property embodied in computer software.
Although the copyright laws were intended to protect and encourage in-
novation, the uncertainty concerning the copyrightability of certain types
of software and the threat of endless litigation have produced the oppo-
site effect. Traditional dispute resolution by litigation has only exacer-
bated this problem. Litigation of such cases is extremely costly and takes
years to reach a final conclusion. By that time, the software at issue is
usually antiquated and no longer in use. Moreover, the issues involved in
software copyright disputes are too complex and technical to be ade-
quately explained to a judge and jury who are unfamiliar with the tech-
nology. In any event, the courts continue to apply general copyright
principles which have little application in the context of high technology
copyright disputes.
As an alternative means of dispute resolution, the imaginative
method developed by IBM and Fujitsu in a final effort to settle their
copyright claims has created a hybrid form of arbitration. By relinquish-
ing extensive control over their businesses to the arbitrators, IBM and
Fujitsu established a sophisticated mechanism to resolve any future con-
flict and forestall future litigation. The arbitrators were able to define the
parameters of the intellectual property rights between the two firms and
provide strict safeguards for the protection and enforcement of those
rights.
Through private, commercial arbitration, large computer firms may
design imaginative remedies to settle their legal claims while preserving
business relationships and their intellectual property rights. Further, by
using private, non-appealable arbitration, the costs of maintaining and
protecting copyrights which accompany the creation of original com-
puter programs will be meager compared to the staggering costs incurred
by the litigation of such cases. Not only will the individual copyright
holders benefit from the use of arbitration in computer software cases,
but society as a whole will reap the value of cooperation between large
computer firms by way of new innovations and reduced costs.
It will be a few years before it is determined whether the private
arbitration approach utilized by IBM and Fujitsu is an effective means of
230. 816 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1987).
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dispute resolution for complex computer copyright cases. However, with
the information available today and the poor history of traditional civil
litigation, the hybrid method of providing extensive authority to care-
fully chosen and trusted arbitrators to resolve disputes appears to be the
best method developed yet. Hopefully, the IBM/Fujitsu proceeding will
be the precursor of a "clearer, cleaner structure" to protect the intellec-
tual property rights embodied in computer software.231
231. AAA Press Release, supra note 139 (quoting Jones).
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